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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (2007) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
In his opening brief, Plaintiff/Appellant ("Plaintiff) presents three issues on 
appeal. Defendant/Appellee Anheuser-Busch Incorporated (*;Anheuser") contends that 
these three issues are more properly expanded to the following five issues: 
1. Whether Plaintiff properly preserved the issue with respect to Plaintiffs 
requested voir dire regarding tort reform and personal injury bias for appeal after the trial 
court conducted voir dire? 
2. Whether the invited error doctrine precludes Plaintiff from challenging the 
trial court's apparent failure to conduct complete voir dire regarding tort reform and 
personal injury bias where Plaintiff failed to object or request that the trial court conduct 
additional voir dire after the court indicated voir dire was completed? 
3. Whether Plaintiff can establish that any error of the trial court in not 
conducting voir dire regarding tort reform and personal injury bias should have been 
obvious to the trial court and that any such error was harmful? 
4. Whether the trial court properly acted within its broad discretion by 
granting both Anheuser and Prominence each a set of peremptory challenges where a 
"substantial controversy" existed between the Defendants in the form of a third-party 
complaint and causes of action for breach of contract and apportionment of fault? 
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5. Whether the trial court acted within its broad discretion by precluding any 
and all evidence of Anheuser's alcohol advertisements where no notice of Plaintiff s 
intent to use the ads was given and they were not part of Plaintiff s original claims in his 
Amended Complaint? 
RELEVANT STATUTES & RULES 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 47(e): 
(e) Challenges to individual jurors; number of peremptory challenges. The challenges 
to individual jurors are either peremptory or for cause. Each party shall be entitled to 
three peremptory challenges. Several defendants or several plaintiffs shall be considered 
as a single party for the purposes of making peremptory challenges unless there is a 
substantial controversy between them, in which case the court shall allow as many 
additional peremptory challenges as is just. If one or two alternate jurors are called, each 
party is entitled to one peremptory challenge in addition to those otherwise allowed. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Plaintiff brought suit against Anheuser to recover for injuries incurred in a slip and 
fall at the Bud World event at the Gallivan Center during the 2002 Winter Olympics. (R, 
1-7.) 
B. Course of the Proceedings. 
This case went to trial before a jury on March 26, 2007. (R. 2223 at 3.) Prior to 
the first day of Plaintiff s case at trial, Anheuser moved for exclusion of any evidence of 
Anheuser's advertising or marketing. (R. 1975-88.) Also, prior to voir dire on the first 
day of trial, the court received Plaintiffs Requested Voir Dire and heard arguments from 
counsel regarding Plaintiffs request that tort reform and personal injury bias voir dire be 
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conducted. (R. 2226 at 1:6-2:23.) After voir dire, the trial court asked counsel if there 
was any more voir dire that they wanted the court to conduct. Plaintiff failed to object to 
the voir dire that was given or to ask for additional voir dire. (R. 2226 at 44:12-15.) 
Finally, during argument before the first day of trial, Plaintiff objected to each defendant 
being given a set of peremptory challenges. (R. 2223 at 115:13-116:16.) 
After the trial, the jury found that Anheuser and Prominence were negligent 
toward Plaintiff, but that Plaintiff and his wife, Kristi Winkler, were also negligent. The 
jury attributed 10% of the fault to Anheuser, 10% to Prominence, 75% to Plaintiff, and 
5% to Plaintiffs wife. The jury awarded Plaintiff economic damages of $2,464.31. (R. 
2079-85.) 
C. Disposition of the Trial Court. 
With respect to evidence of Anheuser's marketing or advertising, the trial court 
ruled that such evidence would be excluded. (R. 2223 at 65:10-78:2, 105:24, 106:13, 
107:13-108:8.) 
Regarding voir dire with respect to tort reform and personal injury bias, the court 
concluded before voir dire took place that it would likely reduce the questions from those 
requested by Plaintiff to give a more general flavor of the issues to the jury. However, 
the court did not state specifically what it would ask, and Plaintiffs counsel made no 
request that the court tell him precisely what would be asked on the issues. (R. 2226 at 
1:6-2:23.) After voir dire was completed by the court, it gave all counsel an opportunity 
to object or address any issues missed by the court. Plaintiff failed to object to the court's 
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apparent failure to inquire completely into juror bias regarding tort reform or personal 
injury bias, or to ask for additional voir dire. (R. 2226 at 44:12-15.) 
The court also determined that a "substantial controversy" existed between 
Defendants and granted each Defendant a set of peremptory challenges based on its 
finding. (R. 2223 at 44:23-48:14.) 
D, Statement of the Facts 
The Accident at Bud World 
This case arises out of Plaintiff s slip and fall when he attended the Bud World 
exhibit in downtown Salt Lake City on or about February 22, 2002. Plaintiff attended a 
mock hockey game on an ice rink that was part of Bud World. Plaintiff volunteered to 
participate and play for a chance to win a pair of tickets to the gold medal hockey game. 
Plaintiff alleged he was intoxicated at the time and that Prominence employees should 
have seen he was drunk and prevented him from participating. (R. 2223 at 1:6-3:3.) 
Plaintiff admitted that he had consumed all but six (6) ounces of alcohol before even 
going to Bud World. (R. 245-46.) Further, there was no evidence that Anheuser served 
Plaintiff alcohol. Prominence was the food and alcohol vendor at Bud World, not 
Anheuser. (R. 40-42.) After going on to the ice, Plaintiff ignored instructions to stand 
still and 6;putt" the puck. Instead, he took off down the ice and fell on his head while 
taking a slap shot. (R. 245-46.) 
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Voir Dire 
On the morning of the first day of trial, the trial court heard arguments from 
counsel on Plaintiffs requested voir dire regarding tort reform and personal injury bias. 
The questions proposed by Plaintiff were asked for the purpose of suggesting to the jury 
pool that damages should be awarded to Plaintiff. Further, Plaintiff required that the 
specific questions regarding "Tort Reform" and a "lawsuit crisis" be discussed in 
chambers with each individual juror. (R. 1741.) Clearly, the trial court did not have 
time, given the scheduled length of the trial, to take each juror into chambers to ask 
Plaintiffs Tort Reform questions. 
Moreover, contrary to Plaintiffs argument, the trial court did not "reject" 
Plaintiffs proposed Tort Reform questions. At that time, the trial court stated, "I may 
reduce them down. I don't know as I'm going to go into the detail. I think more of a 
general flavor of some of these questions would be fine." (R. 2226 at 1:6-2:23.) The trial 
court did not specify precisely what questions would be posed to the jury, nor did 
Plaintiff request prior to voir dire that the court specify what questions would be posed. 
(R. 2226 at 1:6-2:23.) The trial court asked the jury if any outside influences would keep 
them from being biased and impartial. (R. 2223 at 27:21-23.) During and after the trial 
court conducted voir dire, it repeatedly asked counsel if counsel had anything further on 
voir dire. There was no response from Plaintiffs counsel. (R. 2223 at 40:7-9; 44:12-13.) 
Plaintiff failed to object and further failed to request a sidebar with the trial court to 
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request additional voir dire or to object to the court's failure to ask any of Plaintiff s 
requested voir dire on tort reform and personal injury bias issues. (R. 2226 at 44:12-15.) 
Peremptory Challenges 
Prior to jury selection, the trial court heard arguments from counsel as to whether 
Defendants should each be granted a set of peremptory challenges because of the 
presence of a "substantial controversy" between Defendants. The court concluded that a 
"substantial controversy" existed between Defendants and granted each Defendant a set 
of peremptory challenges based on its conclusion. (R. 2223 at 44:23-48:14.) Plaintiff 
claims Defendants settled all disputes between them prior to trial. However, such is not 
the case. In fact, a third-party claim existed between Anheuser and Prominence that was 
not dependent on Plaintiffs claims against either Defendant. Anheuser claimed that 
Prominence was contractually liable to Anheuser for general liability insurance (which it 
failed to procure), failure to properly and skillfully manage the Bud World event (which 
Prominence denied) and for all costs associated with Anheuser's defense of the claim. 
(R. 43.) Further, beyond its contractual duties to Anheuser, Anheuser alleged that if 
Plaintiff was injured at Bud World, it was due to Plaintiffs fault and Prominence's fault, 
not Anheuser's fault. Thus, there would have to be a separate apportionment of fault to 
Prominence. (R. 42, 45, 110, 112-13.) Clearly, a controversy existed between the parties 
that was not resolved by the parties' settlement and would not be resolved until after trial. 
The Stipulation between the parties dealt exclusively with the indemnification issues after 
the verdict had been entered. (R. 2223 at 47.) These issues were not inconsiderable, and 
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depending on the outcome of the trial, could have been quite financially significant. 
During trial, Prominence still faced the allegations of both Plaintiff and Anheuser, that if 
the jury found that the Bud World event was not properly managed, Prominence, as the 
hired manager, would face paying damages to Plaintiff for its own portion of fault, plus 
damages to Anheuser for its breach of contract. 
The trial court considered the Stipulation agreed to by Anheuser and Prominence 
and concluded that despite the Stipulation, because claims remained between Anheuser 
and Prominence aside from the third-party claim for indemnification and apportionment 
of fault, a "substantial controversy" existed between the parties that permitted the trial 
court to grant an additional set of peremptory challenges to Prominence. (R. 2223 at 
44:23-48:14.) 
Plaintiffs Advertising Evidence 
Plaintiff claims further that the trial court refused introduction at trial of 
Anheuser's alleged "irresponsible, reckless and deceptive alcohol marketing and 
advertisements." The trial court excluded this evidence because Plaintiff never disclosed 
the alleged advertisements in any initial disclosures, discovery responses or pre-trial 
disclosures. (R. 2223 at 65:10-70:9.) Further, Plaintiffs amended complaint alleged 
negligence for letting Plaintiff on the ice while intoxicated. It gave no notice of the 
theory that Anheuser's advertising somehow lured Plaintiff into getting drunk outside of 
Bud World, and then to participate in the Shoot on the Goalie Contest. (R. 99-103.) 
Finally, the evidence was excluded because Plaintiffs counsel failed to lay the 
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foundation for the advertisements through Plaintiff. He claimed Plaintiff had researched 
the issue about the advertisements and the volume of beer that Anheuser sells annually. 
(R. 65-79.) The trial court found that there was improper notice of this evidence, and 
insufficient foundation. 
There is also no evidence, as Plaintiff alleges, that (1) the jury apportioned 75% 
fault to Anheuser, or (2) that under question 12(b) on the Special Verdict Form the jury 
answered the Question "no", and then scribbled that answer out which apparently 
constitutes reversible error. (R. 2028.) The jury was polled and unanimously found 
Plaintiff 75% at fault and answered 12(b) "no55. Further, Plaintiffs claims are irrelevant 
because there is no argument in his brief on these issues. (See Plaintiffs Appellate 
Brief.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Point 1: Plaintiff failed to preserve the voir dire issues for appeal 
during trial. 
This Court should not consider Plaintiffs arguments regarding error with respect 
to voir dire. Though Plaintiff made an initial objection regarding the court not asking all 
of his voir dire prior to jury selection (the court said it would ask a modified version of 
Plaintiffs questions), Plaintiff made no objection and no request for additional voir dire 
after it became clear the trial court did not ask the voir dire requested by Plaintiff 
regarding tort reform and personal injury bias. In Utah, it is well settled that in order to 
preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way 
that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on the issue. Where Plaintiff failed to object 
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or request additional voir dire when given the opportunity at the close of voir dire, he 
waived his right to challenge the issue on appeal. 
Point 2: Plaintiff invited any errors committed by the trial court 
on voir dire with respect to tort reform and personal 
injury bias. 
Again, as stated above, Plaintiff did not object or request additional voir dire at the 
close of voir dire. By failing to object or make a request for additional voir dire, Plaintiff 
invited the trial court to commit error. It is well settled that a party can not take 
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into 
committing the error. Accordingly, because Plaintiff failed to object or request additional 
voir dire at the close of voir dire, if error was committed, Plaintiff invited the trial court 
to commit the error. Therefore, this Court should not consider Plaintiffs arguments 
regarding voir dire conducted by the trial court. 
Point 3: Even if Plaintiff did not invite error at trial, any errors 
committed by the trial court were not obvious and were 
not harmful. 
Finally, this Court should refuse to consider Plaintiffs arguments regarding voir 
dire because any errors committed by the trial court were not obvious. Plaintiff failed to 
notify the court that an error may have taken place when given the opportunity at trial 
after voir dire was completed. It could not have been obvious to the trial court at the time 
because Plaintiff did not object or make additional requests. Moreover, there is no 
evidence any error was harmful. Voir dire was presented to the jury pool on issues 
related to potential bias, and there is no evidence that a different jury would have been 
impaneled, or that a more favorable outcome would have resulted. 
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Point 4: Additional peremptory challenges for Prominence were 
necessary because a substantial controversy existed 
between Defendants at trial. 
This Court should affirm the trial court's discretionary decision to grant an 
additional set of peremptory challenges to Prominence. A substantial controversy existed 
between Defendants in the form of Anheuser's Third-Party Complaint against 
Prominence in which Anheuser alleged causes of action for breach of contract, 
indemnity, and apportionment of fault. Prior to trial, Anheuser and Prominence came to 
agreement regarding indemnity. However, during trial, Defendants' position differed 
substantially because of Prominence's failure to procure liability insurance and defend 
Anheuser. Anheuser's claims against Prominence for breach of contract are not 
derivative of Plaintiff s claims against either Defendant and survived the trial and can 
still be pursued against Prominence. Therefore, because a substantial controversy existed 
between Defendants at trial, it was within the trial court's discretion to grant additional 
peremptory challenges to Prominence at trial. 
Point 5: Evidence of Anheuser's alcohol advertising was properly 
excluded. 
This Court should also affirm the trial court's discretionary decision to exclude 
evidence regarding Anheuser's advertising. This evidence was properly excluded for 
several reasons. First, at no time since amending his Complaint did Plaintiff assert a 
legal or factual claim that Anheuser's negligence went beyond the incident at Bud World 
and Anheuser's role in the exhibition during the 2002 Winter Olympics. Second, 
contrary to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff never designated or produced any 
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of Anheuser's advertising material or financial information prior to trial. Third, no 
foundation could have been laid to introduce any of Anheuser's advertising. Fourth, any 
evidence concerning advertising of Anheuser's products was clearly inadmissible, 
irrelevant and unduly prejudicial to the extent a jury could base a decision about liability 
on something other than the facts. Finally, Plaintiffs attempt to blame advertising for his 
own intoxication and negligence fails to state a claim as a matter of law. Therefore, the 
trial court properly excluded evidence regarding Anheuser's advertising. 
ARGUMENT 
L PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROPERLY PRESERVE THE 
VOIR DIRE ISSUE FOR APPEAL AT TRIAL AFTER VOIR 
DIRE WAS CONDUCTED BY THE COURT. 
Contrary to Plaintiffs assertions, the trial court never refused to ask Plaintiffs tort 
reform questions. Plaintiff made clear in his proposed voir dire questions that his 
voluminous tort reform and excess verdict questions had to be asked in chambers. (R. 
1741.) Clearly there was not time for that process to occur. The trial court did ask the 
jury pool if any outside influences would prevent them from being fair and impartial. (R. 
2223 at 27:21-23.) If that was insufficient, then Plaintiffs counsel should have requested 
that the trial court ask more specific tort reform questions when presented with the 
opportunity. The trial court went on to say: 
Did counsel have any additional questions they'd like the Court to 
consider? If so, let's approach the bench if you would. 
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(R. 2223 at 40:7-9.) After the sidebar, additional questions were asked by the trial court 
to the jury pool. None involved tort reform or concerns regarding excessive verdicts. 
Then the trial court said: "All right, anything else counsel before we move forward." 
(R. 2223 at 44:12-13.) There was no response from Plaintiffs attorney. He did not 
demand that the trial court ask his tort reform or excessive verdict questions and he did 
not object to the trial court failing to ask the questions. (R. 2226 at 44:12-15.) 
The Utah Supreme Court set forth the standard for preserving an issue for appeal 
in Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41: 
Generally, in order to preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be 
presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an 
opportunity to rule on that issue. We have set forth three factors that help 
determine whether the trial court has such an opportunity: (1) the issue 
must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised; 
and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal 
authority. In short, a party may not claim to have preserved an issue for 
appeal by merely mentioning . . . an issue without introducing supporting 
evidence or relevant legal authority. Ultimately, the preservation 
requirement is based on the premise that, in the interest of orderly 
procedure, the trial court ought to be given an opportunity to address a 
claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it. 
Id. at ^ 15 (internal quotations and citations omitted.) 
In the instant case, the trial court provided an initial decision on whether all of 
Plaintiffs requested voir dire questions with respect to tort reform and personal injury 
bias would be presented to the jury. The discussion between the trial court and counsel 
was as follows: 
THE COURT: Okay. We'll go on the record with case number 
020910483. We're not [sic] discussing the potential voir dire questions 
and objections. And two, we're addressing the plaintiffs. All right. 
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You've objected to the questions one through four, and the reasons were 
for the record, counsel? 
MR. DALTON: The reasons were that these types of questions generate -
are just intended to generate an inflammatory responses, Your Honor. I had 
this same experience just in my last trial where they used these same 
questions. All the jurors don't like lawsuits. They don't like high verdicts. 
When those questions were last - asked at the last trial that I got at, we 
spent an inordinate amount of time bringing people in that said, oh, the 
McDonald's case or the BMW case. And I think a reasonable question is, 
do you have a problem with resolving disputes through lawsuits is okay. 
But when you start trying to bait people to get, you know, the conservatives 
who don't like big verdicts, then you're just going to get all kinds of 
responses, and it's intended to just - to try to inflame people. 
MR. RATY: Your Honor, these are taken right out of the case law. Our 
appellate courts have recognized we live in a tort reform society. The 
plaintiffs have an absolute right to know the exposure of these potential 
jurors to the propaganda that's generated by these big companies and 
insurance companies on these issues. And, you know, I don't really want to 
threaten you and say, you know, that would be prejudicial error and not to 
give these. But they are right out of the case law, Your Honor, and they're 
very fair questions. When we have a need a right to know if we've got tort 
reformers on this jury. We have the right to intelligently exercise our 
peremptory challenges, and we can't do that if we don't know what their 
opinions are. We don't know what they've been exposed to. These are all 
legitimate questions. I've always had these given in my past trials, and 
they're very appropriate. 
THE COURT: I may reduce them down. I don't know as I'm going to go 
into the detail. I think more of a general flavor of some of these questions 
would be fine. Like - and like for example, question three. Do you 
personally believe that jury verdicts are unreasonable? Well, that's so 
broad, at least to me. Which jury verdict? How much - you know. I think 
(R. 2226 at 1:6-2:23.) 
It is thus clear from the record that the trial court determined initially that it would 
reduce the questions proposed by Plaintiff in his voir dire request with respect to tort 
reform and personal injury bias, and that the trial court would craft its own questions. 
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However, the court did not set forth what questions would specifically be asked, or 
precisely how the tort reform and personal injury bias questions proposed by Plaintiff 
would be pared down. Nor did Plaintiffs counsel request that the trial court tell him 
precisely what questions would be posed or in what form the questions would be asked. 
Therefore, though the trial court made an initial finding on the issue, it left open how the 
questions would be asked. During voir dire, the trial court asked the following questions 
with respect to personal injury bias: 
Is there anybody who has had a family member or a friend or themselves 
ever make a claim for a personal injury that they may have suffered? If so, 
please raise your hand. (R. 2226 at 28:2-4.) 
After receiving some responses to the question, the trial court asked this additional 
question: 
Has anyone had any family member or themselves or a friend make a claim 
for personal injury which you felt was not properly resolved? If so, please 
raise your hand. (R. 2226 at 29:14-17.) 
The trial court went on to ask: 
Is there anybody in the audience that has any questions in your own mind 
[sic] about your ability to be fair and impartial and to be able to return a 
jury verdict solely base upon the evidence that's presented, free from any 
outside influence? If so, please raise your hand. 
(R. 2223 at 27:21-25.) 
At no point during voir dire did Plaintiffs counsel object to the court's questions 
or request a conference with the trial court in chambers to make an objection for the 
record regarding the court's questions with respect to personal injury bias. After 
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completion of voir dire, the court asked all counsel if there was anything else that needed 
to be addressed: 
THE COURT: Thank you. All right. Anything else counsel before we 
move forward? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right Fine. 
(R. 2226 at 44:12-15.) It was only at that point in the proceedings that Plaintiff knew that 
the trial court was not going to ask any more of the voir dire he requested with respect to 
tort reform and personal injury bias. 
Accordingly, though Plaintiff made an initial objection regarding voir dire prior to 
jury selection, because Plaintiff made no objection during or after it became clear the trial 
court would not be asking the voir dire requested by Plaintiff regarding tort reform and 
personal injury bias, Plaintiff failed to object to the trial court's decision not ask the 
questions in a timely manner as required under Pratt. Id. at f^ 15. Plaintiff thus waived 
his objection and failed to preserve the issue for appeal. 
In support of Plaintiff s arguments regarding error with respect to voir dire, 
Plaintiff may reference a case recently decided by this Court in which the plaintiff was 
represented by the same attorney currently representing Plaintiff in the instant case. In 
Alcanzar v. University of Utah, 2008 UT App 222, fl9, this Court concluded that the trial 
court committed reversible error in refusing to ask the plaintiffs' requested voir dire 
questions regarding tort reform and medical malpractice. Plaintiff will likely assert in his 
reply brief that this case is on point with the instant case. 
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However, Alcanzar is distinguishable from the instant case because in the instant 
case Plaintiff failed to properly preserve the issue for appeal by requesting additional 
questions at the close of voir dire, or objecting when given the opportunity at the same 
time. This Court does not reference a similar circumstance m Alcanzar. Moreover, 
Alcanzar was a medical malpractice case in which the trial court permitted extensive 
questioning as to potential jurors experiences with doctors and hospitals and any negative 
aspects of those experiences. Id. at j^ 18. In the instant case, Plaintiff was alleging 
personal injuries as a result of an incident at Bud World. Potential jurors were questioned 
regarding whether anyone had ever suffered a closed head injury, whether anyone had 
any dealings with Anheuser or its products, whether anyone attended the Bud World 
exhibit during the Olympics or participated in any activities, whether anyone had any 
particular feelings or attitude toward companies that manufacture and sell alcohol or beer, 
whether anyone had any background knowledge in subjects such as large events, 
planning, marketing or promotions, or whether anyone had any experience with ice 
related activities and whether any outside influences would affect their ability to be fair 
jurors. (R. 2223 at 24:22-37:13.) In short, it is clear that the trial court conducted voir 
dire sufficient to give Plaintiff enough information about potential jurors5 experiences 
with Anheuser, Bud World, and Anheuser products to make an informed decision that 
was not available to potential jurors in Alcanzar. 
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II. THE INVITED ERROR DOCTRINE PRECLUDES 
PLAINTIFF FROM CHALLENGING THE ISSUE 
REGARDING TORT REFORM AND PERSONAL INJURY 
BIAS VOIR DIRE ON APPEAL WHERE PLAINTIFF 
FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE VOIR DIRE CONDUCTED 
BY THE COURT AFTER IT WAS COMPLETED. 
As illustrated by the facts outlined above, the trial court made an initial ruling that 
it would not present all of Plaintiff s requested voir dire to the jury regarding tort reform 
and personal injury bias but would give a modified version. (R. 2226 at 1:6-2:23.) 
However, once Plaintiff heard the voir dire given to the jury pool, he never asked the 
court to follow up and give more precise questions on tort reform and personal injury bias 
issues, and he never objected to the trial court's failure to give a question on those issues. 
Plaintiffs attorney was aware of this Court's holdings in Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 
101 (Utah App. 1993), and Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991), because they 
were cited in Plaintiffs Requested Voir Dire. 
In Pratt, the Utah Supreme Court stated, "[o]ur invited error doctrine arises from 
the principle that a party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that 
party led the trial court into committing the error." 2007 UT 41, at f^ 17. The Pratt court 
went on to state: 
By precluding appellate review, the doctrine furthers this principle by 
discouraging parties from intentionally misleading the trial court so as to 
preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal. Further, parties are not 
entitled to both the benefit of not objecting at trial and the benefit of 
objecting on appeal. Thus, encouraging counsel to actively participate in 
all proceedings and to raise any possible error at the time of its occurrence 
fortifies our long-established policy that the trial court should have the first 
opportunity to address a claim of error. 
Id (internal quotations omitted.) 
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In the instant case, if the trial court erred, the invited error doctrine precludes 
appellate review on the issue of tort reform and personal injury bias voir dire because 
Plaintiff failed to object to voir dire presented by the trial court as soon as it became clear 
that the trial court did not present enough questions on point to the issues of tort reform 
and personal injury bias. When the trial court completed voir dire it gave all counsel the 
opportunity to object or raise any additional questions with respect to voir dire. Plaintiff 
invited error by failing to suggest additional questions or to make any objections with 
respect to the trial court's questions regarding tort reform or personal injury bias. 
The invited error doctrine also typically requires an affirmative representation to 
the trial court that a party has no objection to the proceedings. 
Affirmative representations that a party has no objection to the proceedings 
fall within the scope of the invited error doctrine because such 
representations reassure the trial court and encourage it to proceed without 
further consideration of the issues. 
Id. at f^ 18. In the instant case, Plaintiff affirmatively represented to the trial court that it 
had no objection to the court's failure to present Plaintiffs requested voir dire regarding 
tort reform and personal injury bias when the trial court asked if counsel had anything 
further and Plaintiff made no objection. (R. 2226 at 44:12-15.) 
Therefore, Plaintiff invited any error committed by the trial court because he failed 
to object to voir dire once it was concluded. Because Plaintiff did not give the trial court 
an opportunity to correct any error, Plaintiff invited the error and review of the issue 
should be precluded. 
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III. IN THE EVENT PLAINTIFF DID NOT INVITE ERROR AT 
TRIAL BY FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE COURT'S 
PRESENTED VOIR DIRE, PLAINTIFF CAN NOT 
ESTABLISH THAT ANY ERROR COMMITTED BY THE 
TRIAL COURT IN FAILING TO PRESENT PLAINTIFF'S 
REQUESTED VOIR DIRE REGARDING TORT REFORM 
AND PERSONAL INJURY BIAS SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
OBVIOUS TO THE TRIAL COURT OR THAT THE 
ERROR WAS HARMFUL. 
In Pratt, the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed that in cases where a party raises an 
issue on appeal that was not properly preserved at the trial court, Utah appellate courts 
review under the plain error standard. 
Under plain error review, we may reverse the lower court on an issue not 
properly preserved for appeal when a party can show the following: (i) an 
error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and 
(iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the [party], or phrased 
differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined. 
In the instant case, there is no evidence that any error committed by the trial court 
should have been obvious to the court or that absent the error there is a reasonable 
likelihood Plaintiff would have received a more favorable outcome at trial. 
In State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, ^  44, the Utah Supreme Court explained that the 
second element of the plain error test requires: 
[T]hat the error be plain, manifest, or obvious to the trial court. In 
explaining this prong, we have held that after examining the record, an 
appellate court must be able to say that it should have been obvious to a 
trial court that it was committing error. In other words, given the 
circumstances, the trial court should have been aware that an error was 
being committed at the time. 
(Internal quotations and citations omitted.) There is no evidence in the instant case that 
the trial court knew or should have known it was committing error. It gave broad voir 
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dire questions on the issues of prejudices and the effect of outside influences on the jury. 
After voir dire concluded, Plaintiffs counsel never pointed out to the trial court that any 
error had been committed. The trial court clearly believed it was within its broad 
discretion with respect to voir dire to reduce Plaintiffs voir dire from what was requested 
to what was asked by the trial court. There is certainly no evidence that it was obvious to 
the trial court that it was committing error. Therefore, if the trial court committed error 
by failing to ask more precise questions regarding tort reform or personal injury bias, 
because there is no evidence that the error should have been obvious to the trial court, 
Plaintiff can not meet the second prong of the plain error test to establish that the error 
should have been plain to the trial court. 
The Casey court further explained that the third element of the plain error test 
requires that the appellate court: 
[DJetermine whether the error was of sufficient magnitude that it affects the 
substantial rights of a party. . . . In other words, . . . the appellant must show 
a reasonable likelihood that absent the error, the outcome would have been 
more favorable. Plain error undermines our confidence in the verdict. 
Id at *H 45 (internal quotations and citations omitted.) In the instant case, Plaintiff can not 
show that any error was of sufficient magnitude that it affected the rights of Plaintiff. 
There is also no evidence that absent the error, the outcome would have been more 
favorable at trial. Plaintiff used his peremptory challenges and a jury was impaneled 
from the primary jury pool. Plaintiff can not show that had voir dire with respect to tort 
reform and personal injury bias been presented to the jury more thoroughly, a different 
jury would have been impaneled, or that a more favorable outcome would have resulted. 
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Therefore, even if this Court determines that Plaintiff did not invite error by failing 
to object to voir dire presented by the trial court, Plaintiff can not establish that any error 
committed by the trial court in failing to present Plaintiffs requested voir dire regarding 
tort reform and personal injury bias should have been obvious to the trial court, or that 
the error was harmful. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR BY GRANTING EACH DEFENDANT A SET OF 
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES BECAUSE A SUBSTANTIAL 
CONTROVERSY EXISTED BETWEEN THE DEFENDANT'S 
IN THE FORM OF A THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT FILED 
BY ANHEUSER-BUSCH AGAINST PROMINENCE. 
Plaintiff asserts that the trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error by 
granting both Anheuser-Busch and Prominence each a set of peremptory challenges prior 
to trial. Plaintiff cites to Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 944 P.2d 346 (Utah 1997), and 
Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993) in support of his arguments that the trial 
court erred in its ruling. However, neither Carrier nor Pro-Tech involved circumstances 
in which a non-derivative third-party complaint was filed to bring a third-party defendant 
into a lawsuit. In the instant case, Plaintiff filed his original Complaint against Anheuser-
Busch only. (R. 1-7.) Anheuser-Busch then filed a Third-Party Complaint against 
Prominence, after which Plaintiff amended his Complaint to include Prominence as a 
defendant. (R. 40-55, 99-103.) 
There are no cases in Utah that address the issue of whether the filing of a third-
party complaint by an original defendant against a third-party defendant constitutes a 
^substantial controversy5'. However, in Randle, the Utah Supreme Court determined that 
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there are only a few scenarios under Utah law that can constitute a substantial 
controversy. The Randle court also held that a trial court has limited discretion only in 
determining whether defendants in a case have a substantial controversy between them 
that would make it proper for a trial court to award additional peremptory challenges. Id. 
at 1333. It defined a "substantial controversy" as the existence of a separate and distinct 
lawsuit from the action existing between the plaintiff and defendants. 
In our view, a "substantial controversy" exists when a party on one side of 
a lawsuit has a cross-claim against a co-party that constitutes, in effect, a 
separate, distinct lawsuit from the action existing between the plaintiffs and 
defendants. When, however, a cross-claim is merely a derivative of the 
original action, such as a cross-claim for indemnification or contribution, a 
"substantial controversy" does not exist for the purposes of Rule 47. 
Id. In Randle, the court concluded that an actual independent lawsuit existed between 
defendant Allen and the two governmental defendants. Defendant Allen cross-claimed 
against co-defendant UDOT and the County, alleging, as had plaintiff Randle, that the 
negligent design and maintenance of the intersection proximately caused his injuries. 
The Randle court concluded that "Allen therefore not only had to defend against Randle's 
claim, but he also had to establish the liability of both UDOT and the County to him. 
Thus, Allen's interest in choosing jurors aligned him with both plaintiff and the other 
defendants." Id. 
In the instant case, Anheuser-Busch's Third-Party Complaint against Prominence 
alleges causes of action for breach of contract, apportionment of fault, and 
indemnification. (R. 21-27.) Anheuser-Busch's Third-Party Complaint against 
Prominence thus constitutes an entirely separate, non-derivative lawsuit between the 
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parties with issues that have still not yet been resolved to the present. Just prior to trial, 
Anheuser-Busch and Prominence entered into the following stipulation regarding 
indemnification: 
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., ("AB") and Prominence, Inc., hereby stipulate, that 
as to AB's third-party claims against Prominence, AB will have an 
automatic judgment against Prominence, for any damages, judgment, 
expenses, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees, either awarded by the jury 
against AB, or incurred by AB in defense of plaintiff s claims. 
(R. 1973-74.) 
Thus, with respect to the indemnification issue, Defendants came to an agreement 
prior to trial. However, Randle requires only that a "separate, distinct lawsuit" exist from 
the action between plaintiff and defendants. In the instant case, Anheuser-Busch had, and 
continues to have to the present, a cause of action against Prominence for breach of 
contract, which is separate and distinct from the causes of action for negligence asserted 
by Plaintiff against Defendants at trial. Anheuser-Busch's claims against Prominence for 
breach of contract are not derivative of Plaintiff s claims against either Defendant and 
survived the trial and can still be pursued against Prominence. Anheuser's pursuits at 
trial were thus very different from the interests of Prominence. 
Specifically, in its Third-Party Complaint, Anheuser-Busch alleged that 
Prominence contracted with Anheuser to procure general liability insurance naming 
Anheuser as an additional insured, which it alleges Prominence failed to do. (R. 24.) 
The required liability insurance was never procured. Further, Anheuser asserted that 
Prominence coxitracted to defend Anheuser should a claim such as the claim made by 
Plaintiff be asserted, and that as a result of Prominence's breach of the contract with 
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Anheuser, it is liable to Anheuser for those damages. (R. 24-25.) These claims, which 
were based on a contract between the Defendants, were independent of any claims 
Plaintiff had asserted against either Defendant. Prominence did not accept Anheuser's 
tender of defense and Anheuser defended itself at trial. Thus, similar to Randle, 
Anheuser not only had to defend against Plaintiffs claims, but it also made efforts at trial 
to establish that Prominence and Plaintiff were the parties responsible for Plaintiffs 
injuries and damages. (R. 40-55.) Anheuser's goals at trial thus differed from those of 
Prominence. 
Accordingly, it was in Anheuser's best interest to convince the jury to apportion 
fault to either Plaintiff or Prominence because any fault apportioned to Prominence 
would have made it easier for Anheuser to pursue its breach of contract claim against 
Prominence. Anheuser does not speak for Prominence, but it was certainly in 
Prominence's best interest for the jury to conclude that Plaintiff was primarily 
responsible for his own injuries. That outcome helped prevent Prominence from having 
to indemnify Anheuser for any judgments awarded to Plaintiff against Anheuser, but it 
has also made it much more difficult for Anheuser to pursue its breach of contract claim 
against Prominence. However, this was something that could not be known until after the 
jury made its decision, which was after Defendants entered into their Stipulation. As a 
result, despite Defendants' Stipulation, Anheuser had to expend additional significant 
time and energy defending against Plaintiffs claims at trial. Prominence was contracted 
to defend those claims. Anheuser believed when it contracted with Prominence prior to 
the Olympics that Prominence would fulfill its obligation to provide liability coverage 
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should any claims be made against Anheuser for personal injury at Bud World, which it 
failed to do. Now that the jury has concluded Anheuser and Prominence bore an equal 
amount of fault for Plaintiffs injuries, it is more difficult for Anheuser to pursue its 
breach of contract claim. 
All of these considerations remained to be determined at trial, despite the 
Stipulation of Defendants. Thus, Anheuser-Busch's interest in choosing jurors aligned it 
with both Plaintiff and Prominence. Anheuser concedes that its interest was much more 
similar to Prominence's interests, but it also had interests similar to Plaintiff in that it 
wanted to show that both Prominence and Plaintiff were liable for Plaintiffs damages 
and injuries, not Anheuser-Busch. 
As stated above, there are no Utah cases that directly address the issue of granting 
a third-party defendant a set of peremptory challenges in addition to those granted to the 
defendant. However, the rationale behind granting each defendant a set of peremptory 
challenges has been extended in Georgia to cases in which a third-party claim can be 
severed from the underlying claim. In Georgia Ports Authority v. Harris, et al, 243 Ga. 
App. 508, 512 (Ga. App. 2000), the Court of Appeals of Georgia held that where a third-
party claim can be severed from an underlying claim, the trial court may exercise its 
discretion to grant additional peremptory challenges to Defendants. 
In the instant case, Anheuser-Busch's claims for breach of contract could have 
been severed from Plaintiffs underlying causes of action against both Defendants for 
negligence. A trial on Anheuser-Busch's breach of contract claim against Prominence 
would have been entirely different from trial in the instant case and would have been 
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more properly tried to the court, rather than the fact-finder, because it would have been 
primarily regarding interpretation of contractual language. Thus, because of the breach 
of contract issues between Defendants, their interests were certainly different at trial. 
Therefore, because Anheuser-Busch filed a Third-Party Complaint against 
Prominence alleging causes of action separate and distinct from the action existing 
between Plaintiff and Defendants, a "substantial controversy" existed between 
Defendants for purposes of Rule 47(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, the 
trial court acted within its discretion and did not commit reversible error in granting each 
Defendant a set of peremptory challenges at trial. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR BY PRECLUDING ANY AND ALL EVIDENCE OF 
ANHEUSER-BUSCH'S ALCOHOL ADVERTISEMENTS. 
A. The doctrine of notice pleading precluded the 
admissibility of new evidence regarding 
advertising. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure require a plaintiff to submit a "short and plain 
statement. . . showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and "a demand for judgment 
for the relief." Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a)(l)-(2). The defendant is required to receive "fair 
notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type 
of litigation involved." Canfieldv. Layton City, 112 P.3d 622, 625 (Utah 2005) (quoting 
Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982)). 
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff brought a negligence claim against Anheuser 
based on the allegations that Anheuser "observed Plaintiff handing the beer in his hand to 
a friend, and was then escorted onto the ice by a Bud player," was told "to swing the stick 
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at a puck on the ice and shoot it into the net," and "was not given skates, a helmet, or any 
other protective equipment" to shoot the puck. (R. 101 at fflf 14-17.) 
At no time since amending his Complaint did Plaintiff assert a legal or factual 
claim that Anheuser's negligence went beyond the incident at Bud World and Anheuser's 
role in the exhibition during the 2002 Winter Olympics. Plaintiffs counsel admitted at 
the conclusion of the first day of trial that his intentions were to show evidence in the 
form of advertising aired or shown to Plaintiff and that the ads played a role in the 
negligence alleged in his Complaint, i.e. the advertising lured Plaintiff into getting drunk 
and thus Anheuser should have protected him from getting on the ice. (R. 2223 at 72:3-
8.) This evidence is not only irrelevant to the claim pleaded, it is inadmissible under the 
doctrine of notice pleading because Plaintiff never raised a claim in any of his moving 
papers that he intended to include a claim of false advertising, negligent advertising, or 
that Anheuser's ads had a causal connection to the Bud World ice rink events and 
Plaintiffs injuries. In short, Plaintiffs pleaded claims against Anheuser and Prominence 
have never included allegations of negligent misrepresentation in its advertising for 
which relief should be granted. 
Moreover, as the Utah Supreme Court has clearly ruled a defendant requires 4*fair 
notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type 
of litigation involved." Canfield, 112 P.3d at 625. The first notice Anheuser received of 
Plaintiffs intent to show clips of Anheuser's purported ads were in his opening 
statements to the jury. The nature and basis of his negligence claim in the pleadings 
against Anheuser dealt exclusively with Plaintiffs alleged personal injuries suffered on 
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February 22, 2002 as a result of Anheuser's alleged failure to provide a safe environment 
on the ice rink at the Gallivan Center. (R. 99-103.) Nothing in discovery alluded to the 
allegation that Plaintiffs attendance or conduct at Bud World that night was induced or 
triggered by advertising. For this reason, any evidence of advertising was properly 
excluded. 
Further, Plaintiff tried to lay the foundation for this evidence through testimony 
from Plaintiff. (R. 2223 at 65:10-70:9.) Plaintiff had no foundation to establish who 
created the advertising or for what purpose such advertising was crafted. 
Plaintiff will argue that Anheuser had notice because questions of Anheuser's 
advertising were asked by Plaintiffs attorney in some of the discovery depositions. 
However, that did not equate to notice that Plaintiff was going to introduce ads and 
advertising statistics at trial to show Anheuser lured Plaintiff into being drunk. None of 
that evidence was ever disclosed in witness or exhibit lists before trial. 
B. Evidence of ads was inadmissible under the rules of 
civil procedure because it was never disclosed and 
could not be used for impeachment purposes. 
It is well established that the discovery rules have the purpose of eliminating 
elements of surprise and trickery so that the court and the parties may determine the facts 
and resolve the issues as directly, fairly, and expeditiously as possible. See Ellis v. 
Gilbert, 429 P.2d 39 (Utah 1967). Also, "a trial is not to be by ambush" by presenting 
withheld evidence. See White v. State, 579 P.2d 921, 924 (Utah 1978). For this purpose 
Rule 26 requires that "a party shall, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to the 
other parties . . . a copy of. . . all discoverable documents, data compilations, and 
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tangible things in the possession, custody or control of the party supporting its claims or 
defenses, unless solely for impeachment." Utah R. Civ. P. 26((a)(l)(B). 
With respect to pretrial disclosures, Rule 26(a)(4) requires a party to provide to the 
other parties "an appropriate identification of each documents or other exhibit, including 
summaries of other evidence, separately identifying those which the party expects to 
offer and those which the party may offer if the need arises." 
In the instant case, and contrary to the rules, there was no designation or 
production of any advertising material, or Anheuser's financial information in Plaintiffs 
initial disclosures, pretrial disclosures, or any supplementations. In fact, Plaintiffs 
counsel remained mum and vague about the exact evidence he intended to introduce at 
trial until the first day of trial. (R. 2223 at 65:10-70:9.) Plaintiffs tactics in hiding the 
evidence until trial is the quintessential, forbidden "trial by ambush" or surprise. His 
failure to disclose the evidence he expected to offer at trial, even as it had begun, violated 
the letter and spirit of the rules of discovery and proper decorum. 
Concerning the use of the evidence for the purpose of impeachment, any evidence 
of advertising was properly excluded because it did not meet the requirements under the 
Rules of Evidence. In particular, Rules 607-610 deal with the use of evidence to impeach 
a witness. Under Rule 607, "the credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, 
including the party calling the witness." Extrinsic evidence relevant to issues of 
credibility is admissible. State v. Rammel, 111 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986). Rule 608 deals 
with addressing a witness's credibility, character for truthfulness, or bias. The rule and 
its supporting case law authority narrow the use of evidence to attack these issues and to 
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impeach. The evidence is certainly inadmissible for meeting a party's burden of proof 
and proving his case. See State v. Reed, 820 P.2d 479 (Utah 1989) (impeachment 
evidence is admissible if it goes to credibility). In sum, the rules allow evidence to 
impeach a witness if their credibility or character for truthfulness is at issue only. 
In the instant case, when the trial court concluded Plaintiff could not use evidence 
of ads in his case in chief to prove the elements of his negligence claim, Plaintiff intended 
to use ads allegedly produced by Anheuser to impeach Anheuser's witnesses. Most 
likely, Plaintiff would have sought to impeach an Anheuser witness concerning the ads 
and their effects on the public in an attempt to poison the jury and gain their sympathy 
and passion. There was no purpose of the ads to establish negligence on the part of 
Anheuser at the Bud World event in general or the activities on the ice rink in particular. 
Simply stated the evidence was not relevant in any way to Plaintiffs bodily injury claim 
or to the credibility of any witness and was therefore properly excluded. 
C. Evidence of advertising was properly excluded for 
lack of foundation and competence from any 
witness. 
Any evidence of the advertising of Anheuser's products was inadmissible because 
Plaintiff could not set forth the requisite foundation. Rule 602 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence provides that "a witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is 
introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the 
matter." 
There is no foundation that could have been laid to introduce the ads. Plaintiff 
did not disclose the source of the ads. Even if Plaintiff could have testified at trial that he 
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saw or heard a particular advertisement, and pinpoint the date when he saw or heard it, he 
could not testify that he has personal knowledge that they were, in fact, advertisements by 
Anheuser verses one of its independent distributors. 
Finally, even if the trial court permitted Plaintiff to attempt to lay the foundation 
through an Anheuser employee, such as Anheuser's Charlie Hodges, no adequate 
foundation could have been laid because he is admittedly not qualified to testify as to 
Anheuser's alcohol advertising, having testified in his deposition that his role in the 
company is narrowly focused on sponsorship of sporting events and, as it related to the 
2002 Winter Olympics, the activation of Bud World. (R. 759-760.) Had plaintiff 
disclosed his intent to use advertising during discovery, he could and should have been 
able to request the department or person with more knowledge about advertising of 
Anheuser's products. Without a proper foundation, the evidence was properly excluded. 
D. Evidence of ads was properly held to be 
inadmissible because it was not relevant and its 
probative value was substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice. 
Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as ''evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Rule 403 excludes any 
evidence whose "probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice/' Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it has the tendency to influence the 
outcome of the trial by improper means, if it appeals to the jury^s sympathy's, arouses its 
sense of horror, and provokes its instinct to punish or otherwise cause a jury to base its 
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decision on something other than the facts of the case. Terry vs. Zions Coop. Mercantile 
Institute, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979). See also, State vs. Lindgren, 910 P.2d 1268 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1996). 
Any evidence concerning advertising of Anheuser's products was clearly 
irrelevant to Plaintiffs case. No fact "that is of consequence" existed to warrant the 
admissibility of the ads because Plaintiff alleged that Anheuser's negligence arose only 
out of its failure to provide a safe place to conduct activities on the ice rink. Plaintiff did 
not plead in his Complaint that the negligence alleged extended to advertising on 
television, radio, or other mediums or that such negligence had a causal connection to 
Plaintiffs injuries. Also, the evidence of ads could not establish that Anheuser's 
negligence during the Bud World event was more probable or less probable. Thus, it was 
properly deemed by the trial court to be inadmissible, irrelevant evidence. 
Moreover, Plaintiffs attempt to introduce surprising new evidence in the form of 
advertisements had as its sole objective to prove his case of negligence by improper 
means. Nothing in his pleadings revealed that Anheuser's alleged negligence went 
beyond its involvement with Bud World. In other words, Plaintiff attempted to expand 
his negligence claim to include evidence regarding Anheuser's advertising when the case 
involved merely a slip and fall on ice. The introduction of any evidence of ads had no 
relevance to prove negligence on the ice rink and would have had the effect of proving 
plaintiffs case by gaining the jury's sympathies, arousing their passion, and provoking 
their instinct to punish only. 
32 
Lastly, besides not having any probative value, such evidence was unduly 
prejudicial to the extent that it had any tendency to cause a jury to base its decision about 
liability on something other than the facts; namely, Anheuser's role as sponsor, 
Prominence's contract and scope of work, and Plaintiffs actions prior to and during his 
attendance at Bud World. As such, the trial court properly precluded Plaintiff from 
introducing this evidence in his case in chief at trial. 
E. Plaintiffs stated theory of relevance fails to state a claim 
as a matter of law. 
Plaintiff argues that Anheuser-Busch's advertising was relevant because it 
allegedly "contributed to plaintiffs alcohol consumption" and "Anheuser-Busch did not 
warn the public" that drinking could lead to intoxication and subsequent injury. (See 
Plaintiffs Brief at 21.) But this theory - which was never pled - fails to state a claim as 
a matter of law. There are no statutes or cases in Utah that impose a duty on sellers or 
vendors of alcoholic beverages to warn drinkers that drinking too much may cause 
intoxication, and that intoxication may cause injury. 
Courts across the country have uniformly refused to allow those who drink 
irresponsibly to foist the blame on advertising. For example, in Overton v. Anheuser-
Busch Co., plaintiff alleged that he was induced to drink by "defendant's television 
advertisements featuring Bud Light as the source of fantasies coming to life, fantasies 
involving tropical settings, and beautiful women and men engaged in unrestricted 
merriment." 205 Mich. App. at 260, 517 N.W.2d at 309. The court rejected the notion 
that these ads wrongfully caused plaintiff to drink, explaining that "the dangers inherent 
in alcohol consumption are well known to the public." Id. at 262, 517 N.W.2d at 310. 
Similarly, in Smith v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 599 A.2d 320 (R.I. 1991), plaintiff 
argued that "the defendant's media advertising caused the plaintiff, who was under age, 
to purchase and consume beer, to drive while intoxicated and to suffer serious permanent 
injuries." Id. at 320. The Rhode Island Supreme Court completely rejected this theory of 
causation as a matter of law. Id. at 321. And in Malek v. Miller Brewing Co., 749 
S.W.2d 521 (Tex. App. 1988), plaintiff argued, inter alia, that defendant should be held 
liable because its advertising purportedly misled a 17-year-old drunk driver to 
erroneously believe that "Lite" beer was less intoxicating than other beers. Id. at 521-22, 
524. The court held that underage drivers "are bound, as a matter of law, to recognize the 
danger of intoxication." Id. at 524; see also Robinson v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 
No. 00-D-300-N, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22474, at *7 (M.D. Ala. July 7, 2000) 
(recommendation of magistrate judge) ("[A] minor's age does not neutralize any 
common knowledge about the dangers of alcohol consumption."), affd, No. 00-D-300-N, 
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22475 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 1, 2000); Gawloski v. Miller Brewing 
Co., 644 N.E.2d 731, 735 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (rejecting plaintiffs' claim that "Miller's 
advertising subconsciously induces people to use its product by 'showing Miller [beer] to 
be a product that enhances life, by it being depicted as socially acceptable, [and] that it is 
1
 Accord Maguire v. Pabst Brewing Co., 387 N.W.2d 565, 568-69 (Iowa 1986) 
(rejecting assertion that brewer created a danger to highway safety by running 
commercials that allegedly promoted consumption of alcohol at taverns by consumers 
who have traveled there by automobile). 
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a positive activity, attractive and harmless."5 (quoting complaint) (alterations in 
original)). 
Plaintiffs attempt to blame advertising for his own intoxication and negligence 
fails to state a claim as a matter of law, and thus the advertising evidence was properly 
excluded. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the trial court's judgment. Plaintiff clearly failed to 
properly preserve the voir dire issue for appeal and invited the trial court to commit any 
errors that may have been committed by not objecting when it became clear the court 
may have committed error. Even if Plaintiff did not invite the error, he can not show that 
the error should have been obvious to the trial court or that the error was harmful. 
Furthermore, the trial court acted well within its discretion in determining that a 
"substantial controversy" existed between Anheuser and Prominence because of 
Anheuser's third-party complaint and because a separate and distinct lawsuit existed 
between Anheuser and Prominence on issues of breach of contract and apportionment of 
fault. Finally, the trial court properly excluded evidence of Anheuser's advertising. 
Respectfully submitted this pO day of June, 2008. 
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